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Never lose an occasion, my friend, to declare, again, that Michelet is the very genius of history; firstly because 
it's true; and, furthermore, it annoys so many people to do so; and it is such a torture for our good friends the moderns...1 
 
‘It is urgent, it is properly vital for philosophy that we use the 19th century as the new Middle 
Ages at last’, pleaded Michel Serres in conclusion to a study on Michelet’s The Sorceress2.  This 
suggestion was scrupulously heeded by Latour, for whom the legacy of the post-Revolutionary 
period acts as a philosophical and political matrix. In a similar way to Serres, Latour sees the 19th 
century as a crucible of contradictions: a rational and modern century, it resolutely partitions 
practices, disciplines and agents into binary oppositions; but in doing so it also causes hybrids and 
quasi-objects to proliferate. Whilst it may think of itself as the heyday of modernity, it is in fact 
the high point of the nonmodern. 
This interpretation is implicit in The Pasteurisation of France (1988), and fully developed in We 
Have Never Been Modern (1991). When the latter was published, the 19th century had become an 
object of intense scrutiny for Latour. As the first section of this study will show, the French 
intellectual climate of the 1980s lent itself favourably to a critical reassessment of the post-1789 
period; the concept of nonmodernity is a distinct product of this Zeitgeist. The first goal of these  
pages is to analyse how Latour’s ideas contribute to a change in the perception of the cultural and 
ideological legacy of the 19th century, and to show how, in bypassing the modern/antimodern 
binary in which it was circumscribed, the concept of nonmodernity restores the 19th century to its 
complexity. The second and third sections of this study will illustrate the crucial role played by 
literature in the reappraisal of the 19th-century as nonmodern, and define literature as the very place 
of origin of nonmodern sensibility. Finally, nonmodernity can also help us make sense of specific 
 
2 
works and authors that had become unreadable or out of fashion under the restrictive paradigm of 
modernity. Latour’s critical toolbox, which is clearly inspired by semiotics and narrative theories3, 
has the potential to rejuvenate our historical approach of 19th-century literary works. This is what 
the final section will illustrate. Jules Michelet will be used as one of the most prominent 
representatives of the nonmodern strand that runs through 19th-century French literature. His works 
exemplify the ambivalence of a century which, whilst apparently upholding the constitutional 
principles of modernity, was also actively undermining them. Hopefully these pages will be in 
keeping with Serres’s suggestion: re-reading Michelet in the light of Latour can help us recover 
networks of meanings and agents that had been discarded, and to read the French 19th century 




In We Have Never Been Modern, the post-1789 period is represented as coterminous with the 
golden age of modernism, conceived both as a temporal rupture between past and present and as 
an epistemological rift between the natural and the social. It coincides with the peak era of 
stabilization of the modernist fallacy, a ‘Second Enlightenment’ during which the critical discourse 
of social sciences further widens the great schisms initiated sometime in the 16th century: between 
nature and culture, the human and the non-human, science and politics. We Have Never Been 
Modern, which by Latour’s own admission was written on the smouldering ashes of naturalism 
and socialism, therefore clearly articulates a critique of the political, scientific and intellectual 
heritage commonly associated with ‘the 19th century’. It denounces and unmasks the triumph of 
the parallel project of scientific domination and political emancipation, whose delusional nature 
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was brutally revealed in 1989, a year dubbed by Latour the ‘year of miracles’. Crucially, 1989 
seems to be the final nail in the coffin of a waning 19th century, whose illusions were finally 
dispelled with the fall of the Berlin wall. 
For Latour, two watershed moments illustrate the illusions inherent in the modernist 
construction of history: 1789 and 1989, the year of the French Revolution and the commemoration 
of its bicentenary, two events which coincide with the beginning and the end of the modernist 
narrative. In the eyes of a modern, the French Revolution is a tabula rasa, the mythical point of 
inception of a new world to come. This interpretation has been dominant for the better part of the 
20th century, under the influence of Marxist historiography. In We Have Never Been Modern, 
Latour joins ranks with thinkers of various ideological backgrounds who, in the favourable 
intellectual climate of the 1970s and 1980s, will challenge these then commonplace assumptions 
about the Revolution and the ‘modern’ century that it spawned. Latour self-admittedly aims to do 
for modernity what François Furet did for the the French Revolution in Interpreting the Revolution 
(1978), namely to emancipate the events and the objects it created from the ulterior discourses that 
organised their coherence. 1789 and 1989 therefore function for Latour as two historical markers 
around which the very notion of history can be revised. Ultimately, he relies on the deconstruction 
of the historicised concept of Revolution  with 1789 and 1989 as its external margins  to write 
a non-modern history of modernity, in other words a history in which the liminal value of these 
dates ceases to be functional.  
 As Latour was writing We Have Never Been modern, French intellectual history was at a 
crucial point of juncture. Marxism, as a hegemonic intellectual and political school of thought, was 
steadily losing ground, as the last vestiges of the regimes it inspired crumbled in Eastern Europe. 
The Revolution had ceased to be a promised land rising on the historic horizon. It had already been 
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confined to the mute strangeness of the past. Against this backdrop, the concept of non-modernity 
is highly representative of what François Dosse recently called the ‘1989 moment’, during which 
the critical bequest of Marxism is re-evaluated. What is also at stake in this intellectual moment, 
beyond Marxism, is a revision of the ulterior reading of the 19th century that was underpinned by 
the hermeneutic totalitarianism of Marxist discourse. Latour’s non-modernity is a paradigm that 
emerges in the midst of a flurry of publications by French historians, intellectuals and essayists, 
which are testament to a newfound interest in a century whose meaning has suddenly ceased to be 
predicated on a political eschatology. A few representative examples will illustrate this revival.  In 
the wake of Furet's revisionist reading of the Revolution, claiming that la Révolution française est 
terminée (the French revolution is over), the publication of Pierre Nora's Lieux de mémoire 
Rethinking France relegates the 19th century’s ideological legacy into the past: for Nora, it has 
ceased to be ingrained in living national memory, and should be now treated with the distance and 
dispassionateness owed to earlier periods of history. Over the same period of time, the Orsay 
museum (1986) opens its doors to the public, making the 19th century a state-funded object of 
musealisation and commemoration in its own right, in a gesture that further stresses its uncanny 
remoteness. Meanwhile, Philippe Muray denounces the collusion of socialism and illuminism in a 
ferocious pamphlet, Le 19e siècle à travers les âges The 19th Century Through the Ages (1984). 
The 1980s and early 1990s are a long procession of farewells to the century that preceded. Be they 
nostalgic or revengeful, they always feature the same line of arguments: the 19th century is to blame 
for a historical promise it didn't keep (socialism), while the alliance of technical mastery of nature 
and social progress it heralded (naturalism) also proved to be a fallacy.  
Latour's concept of non-modernity evidently feeds into this moment of French thought. The 
idea that we have never been modern is rooted in the belief that revolutions in fact never really 
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happened, and indeed cannot ever happen: there never was an unbridgeable rift between a ‘before’ 
and an ‘after’, but only ulterior intellectual and political interpretations that constructed and 
imposed a discontinuous narrative of history.  
A welcome side effect of this theoretical reassessment in philosophy, politics and literary 
studies is that it also paved the way for the rediscovery of figures that had been rejected by 
modernity, or until then confined to obsolescence. These figures, though Latour’s lens, can now 
be interpreted as the main protagonists of a non-modern narrative of the 19th century. In political 
philosophy for instance, the 70s and 80s were hailed as a ‘return to Tocqueville’, inaugurated by 
liberal philosopher Raymond Aron. This philosophical comeback gained momentum, once again, 
thanks to Furet’s book, which commends Tocqueville’s moderation and nonteleological 
perception of history. Tocqueville’s intellectual patronage is one that Latour also readily 
acknowledges when he states that ‘modernity still awaits its Tocqueville’4—a role that he is 
evidently willing to take on himself. By virtue of his emphasis on permanence and continuity in 
history (or, as Latour would put it, extension and acceleration of practices by a greater number of 
agents) rather than on rupture and purity, Tocqueville is the building block on which an heterodox 
(i.e. non-Marxist) reassessment of the historical legacy of the 19th century can be built. Other 
figures re-emerge in his wake, among which those writers and thinkers who had been idolised by 
the French Third Republic, made into national prophets of progress and democracy, and had then 
been largely shunned by advocates of political or aesthetic modernity, among whom towering 
literary figures such as Hugo or Michelet, to whom I will turn in the final section of this text. The 
loose corpus of ideas these writers adhered to was aptly named ‘humanitarianism’ by historian of 
ideas Paul Bénichou, who highlighted their attempts at determining a new secular faith for post-
Revolutionary France, based on a blend of political and moral optimism, a belief in the pacifying 
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and progressive impact of education and technology, a faith in the inevitability of democracy, and 
the celebration of the people as the historic agent behind this drive towards progress. Victor Hugo, 
the most universally recognised of these figures, is also the one who most remarkably returned to 
the limelight in the mid-1980s. In 1985, the French government celebrates the centenary of the 
writer’s death with a flurry of events aimed at reminding younger generations of the writer’s 
importance in the construction of French Republican identity. The backdrop of these celebrations 
is distinctly one of ideological disarray that chimes in with Latour’s critique of revolutionary 
eschatology: at this point François Mitterrand's socialist administration had long given up its early 
ambition of breaking away from capitalism and of ‘changer la vie’ changing life, and steadily 
initiated a conversion to market economy. As the lyrical illusions of May 1981 subsided, the left 
looked for alternative narratives that would allow it to abandon its radical legacy, which was still 
ripe with the promise of a new revolution to come. The French socialist party tried to reinvent 
itself as a progressive force whose main task was now to curb the excesses of a liberal democratic 
order whose foundations they no longer wished to challenge. At this stage in the dissolution of the 
ideological corpus of the left, pre-Marxist humanitarian figures could provide a welcome fallback 
narrative. This is precisely what Philippe Muray pinpoints in his 1984 controversial study. 
According to Muray, the reason why returning to references such as Tocqueville or Hugo proves 
so effective is that, however different they might be on other counts, they provide an alternative 
narrative to the Manicheism of revolutionary teleology. They do so, essentially, by reintroducing 
two elements that Marxism rejected: firstly, the idea of Providence (the crossed-out God, in 
Latour's words); secondly, and crucially for the scope of the present article, they challenge the 
process of purification that led to the division between human and non-human subjects. Here again, 
Tocqueville and Hugo foreshadow a distinctly nonmodern take on the century. A chapter in 
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Tocqueville's Democracy in America emphasizes, for instance, an environmental agency in the 
felicity conditions of American democracy: ‘there are a thousand circumstances independent of 
the will of men that make it easy to have the democratic republic in the United States’,5 Tocqueville 
writes, among which is nature itself: ‘in the United States, it is not only legislation that is 
democratic; nature itself works for the people.’6 As Pierre Charbonnier notes, Tocqueville here is 
hinting that there might be ‘ecological conditions to freedom and equality’.7 As to Hugo, his 
providentialist ontology refuses to separate humans, animals, and objects: ‘In this century’, he 
claims, ‘I am the first who has spoken not only of that human and non-human agencies are 
coterminous, and underpinned by hidden principle of unity. Muray points out that what defines 
‘19th-centuryness’ is precisely the idea that all forms of life stem from the same vital unity. 
Politically, this bolsters an optimistic vision of the ‘people’ or the ‘masses’, represented as being 
instinctively closer to this common vitalist matrix than other classes, such as, say, bourgeois 
intellectuals. This has a distinct appeal for the 1980s, especially for the left, as it looks for new 
‘historic agents’ to represent, and new ways to articulate its own mission, now that is has 
abandoned its ambition to make a clean break with the past. An emphasis on unity and connection 
is what Jean Baudrillard signposts as the characteristic ideological sidestep of the left as he 
publishes the ominous La Gauche divine [The Divine Left] in 1985: socialism has become a pure 
celebration of interaction and social links. It extols the virtues of the ‘circularity of exchanges’, 
putting forth vitalism and mediation as foundations of the body politic, at the expense of ‘the 
violent myth of the social’ embodied by the Revolutionary tradition. It has, in a word, forfeited 
modernity in favour of non-modernity. 
There is evidence, then, to suggest that towards 1989, the ‘year of miracles’, France operated 
an return to heretofore neglected aspects and figures of the 19th century, in order to counteract the 
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ideological void left by the simultaneous collapse of two pillars of modernity: confidence in the 
domination of nature on the one hand, faith in the emancipation of humanity on the other hand. 
The rise of the nonmodern marks a period of ideological reshuffle for the left.  
It makes sense, as a result, to include Latour’s philosophical stance into what Bernard Hours 
defined as ‘the thought of the bicentenary’:8 Latour’s denunciation of the pitfalls of modernity 
chimes in perfectly with contemporary reassessments of the mission, purview and agents of the 
French left. But within this broad movement, Latour’s approach is unique. Its originality lies in 
the resolutely anachronistic bias of his critical apparatus. In refusing to take the premise that history 
is made of clearly defined ‘befores’ and ‘afters’ for granted, Latour fundamentally differs from the 
many iterations of post-modern or anti-modern discourses that have determined the oppositional 
boundaries of the French intellectual field for the last forty years. In contrast, Latour insists that 
the idea that ‘time passes’ is itself a by-product of the modern constitution: ‘the connections among 
beings alone make time. It was the systematic connection of entities in a coherent whole that 
constituted the flow of modern time’.9 History, and the process of division it implies, is hence 
always potentially guilty of a typically modernist sin. It theoretically splinters past and future, 
rendered incommensurable by denying their common mediations—when in fact any given point 
of history is filled with resurgences: ‘the past remains, and even returns’.10  
It is obvious that what Latour is denouncing here is a vision of history and progress that is 
typically attached to the very constitution of the 19th century as a stable ideological point of 
reference, and that I have outlined above. However, as Jean-Baptiste Fressoz argues, ‘modernity 
has never been unequivocal in its mechanistic view of the universe and in its project to attain 
technological mastery of the world … nineteenth-century technological modernization did not 
occur in a fog of unconsciousness or a modernist frenzy’.11 If, as Latour shows in the wake of 
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François Furet, the French Revolution was not revolutionary as its events unfolded, then we should 
also entertain the possibility that the 19th century, as a whole, was already aware of its own 
nonmodernity even as it unfolded the thread of the modern narrative; we can think afresh our 
relation to the 19th century by considering it as the cradle of nonmodernity. This is one of the many 
avenues of research opened by We Have Never Been Modern: for is it not precisely over the course 
of this undisputed century of triumphant modernity, as the exclusions underpinning the modern 






The hypothesis of this section is that these hybrids found a welcoming environment in literary and 
artistic production. As the 19th century tries to define ‘modernity’ in literature and the arts, it is in 
fact already tiptoeing towards a definition of the nonmodern. Literary modernity is defined not a 
process of purification and rupture, but as its exact opposite, namely a trigger for the production 
of hybrids and for the representation of mediations. This justifies why we should turn to it now to 
look for an alternative to the all-too implacable logic of modernity as a rift. 
It is perhaps inevitable to refer to Baudelaire, as he provides both the most comprehensive and 
most influential definition of ‘modernity’ provided in France at a time when the word modernity 
was still a neologism—he is indeed among the first to deal with the notion. ‘By modernity’, 
Baudelaire writes, ‘I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other 
half is the eternal and the immutable’.12 Baudelaire's ‘modern’ is a far cry from the polarising 
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mainstream interpretation of modernity that is condemned in We Have Never Been Modern. Far 
from it: it is essentially not incompatible with Latour's non-modern, to the extent that both notions 
can be seen as cognate. This is true in particular with respect to their perception of time and the 
teleological construction of history. H.-R. Jauss rightly points out that Baudelaire's conception of 
modernity ‘no longer even understands itself as epochally opposed to some determinate past 
[...]’.13 In this definition, Jauss adds, ‘the great historical antithesis between the old and the new, 
between ancient and modern taste, gradually loses its currency’.14 Baudelaire sees modernity as 
nothing else than an experience of entanglement and heterogeneity.  
As a result, the aesthetic experience of modernity is in effect one of blurred boundaries. It 
challenges the radical rupture between past and present, between ‘them’ and ‘us’, that Latour sees 
as the act of faith of the modern mindset. Indeed, in line with Baudelaire’s definition, the modern 
literary canon develops an ambivalent and critical reaction to the experience of the acceleration of 
technical and social times, as well as to the process of political rationalisation. As Antoine 
Compagnon has shown, this points to a fundamental ambivalence at the heart of the modern 
project: masterpieces of modern literature developed into a haven of anti-modern political feeling: 
‘historically, modernism, or true modernism, worthy of this name, has always been antimodern, 
that is ambivalent, self-reflective, and experienced modernity as an uprooting’.15 At least within 
the specific province of literary experience, then, the seemingly irreconcilable notions of the 
modern and the anti-modern overlap and contaminate each other. 
As far as I know, Latour doesn't explicitly refer to this Baudelairian etymology, nor does he 
pay particular attention to literary incarnations of the concept of modernity. This is despite their 
evident proximity with some aspects of the non-modernity he advocates. For what is true of the 
French Revolution does apply to the literary experience of modernity: one should differentiate the 
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‘modalities of historical action’ from the ‘process’16. ‘Modern’ writers used the concept of 
modernity to understand what they were going through and to give it meaning; but this does not 
mean that, in practice, their writing was modern, no more than—in Furet and Latour’s eyes—the 
French Revolution was revolutionary. 
III 
Before I turn to Jules Michelet’s works as a prime example of nonmodern practice, it is useful 
to illustrate how nonmodernity can be used to challenge certain undisputed premises of literary 
history. The great shift of modernity in literature can be summarised in very broad sweeps as 
affecting first and foremost the status of imitation. Before modernity, models prevail; the order of 
mimesis is one of conformity with tradition and with an essentialised reality that it is the mission 
of the literary text to illustrate and reconfigure. After modernity, though, the text becomes its own 
standard of evaluation, liberated from the shackles of aesthetic norms; its relation to reality 
becomes increasingly conscious of its mediated nature; the type of connections that can be drawn 
between reality and its textual representation becomes contingent on highly subjective, and 
potentially infinite, variations. With Latour, it is the two main tenets of literary modernity, namely 
its self-reflexive nature and its autonomy from non-literary discourses, that are questioned. They 
correspond to a twofold and complementary process of purification (in the affirmation that there 
is a separate type of discourse called ‘literature’ which is incommensurable with others) and 
mediation (literature claiming to be a unique and privileged channel for the expression of the whole 
of human experience): this is the very same process as the one defining the modern paradox as a 
whole. 
To an extent, then, Latour's non-modern does justice to the way modern literature defined itself 
in the 19th century: not as a clean break or a new dawn, but as an uncertain encounter of darkness 
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and light, populated with uncertain creatures. It places the notion of hybridity and mediation at its 
centre. In doing so, it also radically decentres the focus of literary history. If non-modernity is a 
valuable category to understand literary history, then it can potentially, and considerably, alter the 
composition of our traditional 19th-century literary Pantheon—exit Flaubert, say, and enter 
Michelet. 
Another exciting promise carried by the concept of nonmodernity in literary studies is that it 
prompts to scrutinise the way writers negotiated their own aesthetic practices, and to refuse to take 
their (or anyone else’s) ulterior discursive rationalisations for granted. It does so, however, in a 
way that notably differs from the tradition of contemporary sociology of literature. This discipline 
which, in the wake of Bourdieu’s The Rules of Art, has developed a methodology that aims to 
account for the positions occupied by writers within the cultural, social and economic spheres of 
their time, using concepts of habitus and capital at their centre.  Specialists of sociopoetics, such 
as Alain Viala or Jérôme Meizoz, made effective use of the concept of ‘posture auctoriale’  
‘auctorial posture’, or ‘author’s image’ to describe the way writers negotiated their identity within 
the literary field. What this school of criticism takes for granted, however, is that auctorial postures 
are necessarily predicated on the existence of an autonomous literary field that single-handedly 
steers a writer’s social and artistic trajectory. As William Paulson pointed out,17 the very existence 
of this divide between literary and non-literary discourses is something that the concept of non-
modernity challenges: this divide can be seen as a prime example of purification, akin to the one 
that artificially separates nature and society. A nonmodernist literary history would hence 
challenge the misplaced sociological polarities of the 19th-century French literary field—between 
‘art for art's sake’ on the one hand and ‘bourgeois art’ on the other—, and focus instead on the 
‘Middle Kingdom’, especially on those productions that have been expelled from the realm of 
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institutionalised literature. It would consider literature as moving ‘via spirals and eddies, forever 
reviving dead forms in new guise’18—genres, tropes, topoi and types would then have to be 
understood in their entanglement and recurrences rather than in the brutal breakups that set them 
apart. It would also strive to bridge the age-old gap between authorial intentionality on the one 
hand and reader’s freedom of interpretation on the other hand, by conferring agency to other 
elements within and outside of the text, as Latour himself suggests:  ‘Balzac is indeed the author 
of his novels, but he often writes, and one is tempted to believe him, that he has been “carried 
away” by his characters, who have forced him to put them down on paper’…19  
 
I have already mentioned that the concept of non-modernity was implicit in Baudelaire’s 
definition of modernity, and that the apparent rift between moderns and anti-moderns had, in fact, 
always spawned literary hybrids. The argument could be made—it is implicit in Compagnon—  
that ‘literature’, rather than being the name given in the 19th century to the institution of an 
autonomous field of cultural production with its own set of values and rules of inclusion and 
exclusion, is in fact the very embodiment of the ‘Middle Kindgom’, the place where the combined 
work of purification and mediation is at its most visible, finds its most welcoming environment, 
and reveals its profound solidarity. For in spite of all attempts at defining its essence, literature 
remains indeed an experience of hybridity, a discourse that can only be defined by what it does to 
other discourses, and by the extent to which it alters subjectivities. ‘As for texts, why deny them 
the grandeur of forming the social bond that holds us together ?’,20 asks Latour: literature can be 
envisaged as a network of bonds, material, subjective and textual at one and the same time, making 
it the paragon of quasi-objects.  
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Someday, perhaps, teachers and scholars will refer to ‘nonmodern literature’ with the same air 
of aplomb and self-confidence as they would talking about romanticism or realism. The reality of 
19th-century writing practices cannot be fully explained away by the ulterior justifications provided 
by the modern/antimodern divide. Latour prompts us to take a new approach to the construction 
of the literary canon – via a Latourian rereading of the Baudelairian construction of ‘modernity’ – 
and to turn our attention to works that slipped through the cracks, works that had been nonmodern 




The text as a quasi-object, as a bond, as the utopian milieu where different agents, things, beings 
and events find a space of negotiation and mediation: this is how Latour’s concepts can help us 
constitute the paradigm of a non-modern literary history, which does justice to the 19th-century’s 
own complex relation to modernity. Assuredly, Jules Michelet, a historian and a moralist, a 
Professor at the Collège de France and the author of a monumental and passionately subjective 
history of the French Revolution, would figure prominently in any textbook on non-modern 
writing. Michelet sits uncomfortably between genres and disciplines: besides his historical 
writings, he was also the author of natural histories such as The Insect (1858) or The Sea (1861), 
or of moral treatises such as The People (1846). He was also a prolific diarist. What makes him 
an exemplary case study is that his intellectual career is also an evolution from modernity to 
nonmodernity. He was originally very much the shining example of a modern in Latour’s 
sense—a thinker who believed in the unbridgeable differences between humans and non-
humans—so much so, in fact, that it is in Michelet’s works that some of the most prescient 
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definitions of what Latour will describe as the constitutional conditions of modernity can be 
found. Let us now follow the trail of Michelet’s conversion to non-modernity. 
 In the very first paragraph of his Introduction to World History (1831), Michelet posits an 
absolute separation between nature and man as the foundation of his vision of human agency: 
‘With the world, a war began that will end with the world, and not before: the war of man against 
nature, of spirit against matter, of liberty against fatality. History is nothing but the story of this 
endless struggle’.21 This separation, more brutally expressed by Michelet than by any other thinker 
of his time, spells out what Latour defines as the first conditions of the modern constitution, namely 
the absolute separation of nature and society. In Michelet’s early texts, this separation is 
coextensive with a rejection of the Christian dogma of Grace, to which he substitutes the 
Revolutionary ideal of Justice. As Bénichou notes, ‘in fact, invoking Justice against Grace is 
wanting God’s justice to be our own: God, in Michelet’s eyes, can only love us according to Law, 
Reason and Justice, that is according to the idea Man has of God’.22 In rejecting Grace, Michelet 
candidly exposes one of the guarantees of Latour’s modern constitution, the ‘crossed-out God’: 
the divine is simultaneously  transcendent (Grace is rejected from the realm of human actions) and 
immanent (in the form of Justice, which is defined by humans). The principles of Christianity and 
those of the Revolution were as incompatible to the early Michelet as those of nature and human 
progress.  
 
And yet, as Mitzman points out, Michelet’s ideas change over the course of the 1840s and 
1850s: ‘from a basic belief in the linear progress of freedom through conflict with and liberation 
from the natural world, he came to accept a cyclical view of nature and spiritual existence built on 
the principle of harmony.’23 The watershed moment for this change is June 1848 and the 
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disillusions brought about by the demise of the Second Republic and the 2 December coup of 
Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte. This troubled historical context is exacerbated by personal 
circumstances, as Michelet is dismissed from the Collège de France on 12 March 1851. Michelet’s 
view of history had thus far been predicated on the idea of the French Revolution as a clean break, 
revealing new universal principles to France and to the world: ‘Did France exist before that time? 
It might be denied’.24 The Revolution functions theoretically as an absolute origin: ‘Grand, stange, 
surprising scene! To see a whole people emerging, at once, from nonentity to existence …’. But 
what June 1848 challenges for Michelet is the confidence in a linear perfectibility of societies that 
was implicit in this vision of Revolution as ground zero. Michelet’s appraisal of history changes 
accordingly. Rather than being represented as a clean break, made at an identifiable moment in 
time by a defined set of rational agents, the Revolution becomes a spiritual principle, one whose 
incarnation is neither limited to human agency, nor to a distinct chronology.  So much so that 
historical discourse is no longer sufficient to explain it away: it is treated, as Gossman points out, 
as an ‘ever-renewed promise of redemption’25, in which all of creation  man, nature and things  
equally partakes.  
1848 is to Michelet what Latour showed 1989 to be for his generation: a ‘year of miracles’ in 
which the contradictions of modernity are crudely exposed, and the shortcomings of a dominant 
ideologies brutally unmasked. Now that the Revolution as a historical process had proved to be 
reversible, its true nature is to be found elsewhere: in other agents, in other temporalities. 
Michelet’s latter intellectual production is increasingly interested in finding a space of 
representation for agents that had had little or no voice in historical discourse so far, whether these 
agents are human (the people, the sorceress) or, more interestingly perhaps, non-human (the sea, 
the bird, the mountain, the insect).  In doing so, Michelet does not seek to impose his own human 
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rationality on them, but rather embraces the idea that history is a form of alchemy that involves 
the participation of a multiplicity of subjets and objects, as well as the co-existence of historical 
time and natural cycles of recursivity and renewals. Michelet’s premonition, which leads to a 
fundamental  of his ideology in the 40s and 50s, is as follows: while human and non-human 
agencies, or indeed human and non-human temporalities cannot be conflated, they are in fact 
underpinned by a profound unity, that it is the mission of the writer to reveal.26 In Michelet, as 
Barthes noted, there is ‘no barrier of essence between the orders of nature: the mineral is the plant, 
the animal contains the human dream.’27 Michelet’s work becomes a meditation on the relation 
between nature and culture,28 supported by two principles that anticipate Latour’s non-modern 
paradigm: irreducibility on the one hand, and translatability on the other. Nothing in Michelet’s 
world can claim to be the universal equivalent of anything else, yet everything is equally correlated 
and worthy of representation. In The Insect, for instance, Michelet addresses non-human agents as 
equal partners: ‘If thou toilest and lovest, O Insect, whatever may be thy aspect, I cannot separate 
myself from thee. We are truly somewhat akin. For what am I myself, but a worker ?’29 Michelet’s 
world is one without stitchings, where the smallest elements of inert nature are bestowed with the 
same intensity of agency and subjectivity, down to the tiniest ant: ‘however humble the insect may 
seem in appearance … it exists independently; it moves, goes, comes, advances or returns … 
it suffices for itself; it foresees, provides, defends, and boldly confronts the most unexpected 
chances. In this, then, do we not discern, as it were, a first glimpse of personality?’30 
No discourse then, be it the discourse of the historian as opposed to the discourse of ‘the people’, 
and no agent, be it the ‘great man’ as the subject of history as opposed to the insect, the mountain 
or the bird, can be said to encapsulate and express the meaning of others. Yet everything may 
become the object of a translation—humans and non-humans can become allies to each other; as 
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Latour puts it, ‘an actor expands while it can convince others that it includes, protects, redeems, 
or understands them’31.  
Expansion and understanding are precisely the missions assigned to writing by Michelet.  
Writing triggers a process of empowerment of other agents, during which the writer’s 
autonomous rationality gets profoundly altered by mediations. In The People, Michelet 
represents himself as a spokesperson for the different classes that make up the social fabric of 
France, for, he claims, ‘I unite them all in my in my own person’:32 his word becomes the very 
nexus of mediation where different beings, who have no other space or voice, find their natural 
habitat. Beings and things are porous in Michelet’s ontology, which also means that, conversely, 
the writer’s voice own subjectivity can merge with non-human agencies, as in this famous 
example in The Mountain 1866, in which Michelet recounts the experience of taking mud baths 
at Acqui: 
The only image that I could then cherish was that of Mother Earth – Terra Mater. I felt her 
very plainly, caressing and pitying and warming her wounded child. Without? Ay, and 
internally also. She interpenetrated my frame with her vivifying principles, entered into and 
blended with me, insinuated into my being her very soul. The identification between us grew 
complete. I could no longer distinguish myself from her.33 
As this example shows, Michelet advocates a fundamental ontological equality between human 
and non-human subjects, hereby anticipating Latour. Unsurprisingly for the graphomaniac that he 
was, however, Michelet endows the practice of writing, and book as objects, a privileged status 
within this flat metaphysics. Michelet clearly insists on the capacity of the written word to have 
the same ontological status as other human and non-human subjects. Texts are to be understood as 
having their own agency. But also, because everything can eventually be translated into a textual 
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form, Michelet hints that a book might indeed be the most welcoming space of all, one in which 
all temporalities can be deployed, and all voices are represented—while in the extratextual world 
epiphanies like that of the Aqui mud baths are rare. Texts, therefore, are the ultimate mediators, 
the most effective environment for networks to reveal themselves, and for the limitations of 
modernity’s oppositional structure—human vs. non-humans, subject vs. object, science vs. 
politics…—to be exposed. For Michelet, the most meaningless duality of them all is no doubt the 
separation of the self and the world. We have to take Michelet seriously when he writes, in the 
Preface to the History of France (1869): ‘My life in this book, it has been transformed into it. This 
book has been my life’s only outcome’34: for the extraordinary power of the text is that it suspends, 
however briefly, the antagonism of the self and the world. In the written word, Michelet seeks the 
ideal unity he can no longer find in history, the elusive balance between his own subjectivity and 
its dissolution within a collective of other actants. This moment of equilibrium defines both what 
a writer should be for Michelet—the momentary spokesperson of a variety of different and 
potentially conflicting agents—and what he also ends up seeing as the real incarnation of the 
Revolutionary spirit, namely a moment of unity and harmonious polyphony that can be both 
eternally preserved by texts and yet for ever reactualised in the act of reading. As Gossman 
suggests, ‘is it not, in fact, by transforming the Revolution into literature that Michelet hopes to 
suspend the fragile epiphanic moment and make it eternal, indefinitely re-presentable and 
renewable ?’35 
Michelet’s writing established a continuum between human and non-human, facts and 
subjectivity, autobiography and collective narratives, science and fiction. These are seamlessly 
entangled in his works. In Latour’s word, Michelet’s books can be read as factishes: he writes them 
as much as he is written by them, with ‘the robust certainty that allows practice to pass into action 
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without the practitioner ever believing in the difference between construction and reality, 
immanence and transcendence’36—to the extent that it threatens the very integrity of both himself 
as a writer and his book as a historical or scientific artefact. Michelet’s originality and exemplarity 
is that the very essence of his work is to display and dramatize these negotiations rather than to 
hide them. The writer himself is torn between a sense of failure—the impossibility to purify, the 
feeling that an excess of language and meaning is constantly created—and the acknowledgement, 
more and more consenting and enthusiastic as Michelet gets older, that other agents do have a right 
to be represented, and that at the root of history and human experience lies the mysterious unity 
postulated by translatability. Michelet increasingly conceived of his role as writer and as an 
historian as that of the delegate of a parliament of things. 
Conclusion 
 
Three short conclusions can be drawn from this reading of Michelet and the notes that precede 
it. Firstly, if Michelet is indeed a non-modern, it is no doubt because he was also, at first, a 
disillusioned modern, shaken by the possibility of history going backwards or of the Revolution 
being erased. Non-modernity is present, in other guises, in ‘progressive’ writers such as Hugo or 
Zola, who shared Michelet’s fears. There is a non-modernist vein that runs through the French 19th 
century, and that is still largely unexplored. Secondly, while Michelet did not consider his 
production as literary, what he does is precisely to define a characteristic of nonmodern literature: 
by granting all agents the same ontological status, nonmodernity unveils the essentially narrative 
nature of all disciplines: ultimately, distinctions between the literary and the scientific, the factual 
and the fictional, are secondary. As suggested before, a great number of texts who sit halfway 
between disciplines—this is of course Michelet’s case, but one can think of the works of Fourier 
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or Pierre Leroux, among others—could be reassessed. Thirdly, as Roland Barthes hinted in an 
article aptly called ‘Michelet’s Modernity’,37 what made writers like Michelet ‘unreadable’ before 
the ‘year of miracles’ is precisely what makes them relevant and young again today: their interest 
for symbolic mediations, their concern for the problems of delegation of authority and voice—
who can speak, on whose behalf? What channels of communication/translation can be used? How 
can nonhuman agency be represented ?... These questions seem more pressing in the early 21th 
century, as we are negotiating ways of defining a democratic and natural contract that can 
accommodate both humans and non-humans in the face of political and ecological disaster. 
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